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hand in Archbold's Criminal Pleading robbery is treated
as being of the essence of piracy jure gentium (p 670):
while in Hawkin's Pleas of the Crown (Ch. XX 8th Edition
p 251) there appears to be a conflict between Sections 1
and 3 as to whether actual robbery is essential. It is
worth noting, however, that statutes such as the
Suppression of Piracy Act 1698 Section 11 and 6 Geo. IV
C. 49 (an Act for encouraging the capture or destruction
of piratical ships and vessels) suggest that Parliament
recognised that piracy, though frustrated, was nevertheless
piracy. See also the judgment of Dr. Lushington on the
latter Statute in Serhassan (2 W.Rob.354).
The chief argument to the contrary is founded
on the charge to the Grand Jury by Sir Charles Hedges in
R v. Dawson (1696 13 State Trials 451 at 454) (approved
in Kwok a Sing's case) but the conclusiveness and authority
of his definition appear to be us to be capable of being
discounted by two factors (1) he was dealing with charges
where robbery of the clearest kind had occurred (2) he
was charging a Grand Jury at the second trial of the same
prisoners, and it is tolerably clear from the circumstances
that the occasion was not one when Sir Charles Hedges
would have deemed it either necessary or expedient to
embark on the niceties of technical definition. For such
reasons, notwithstanding the Privy Council's adoption of Sir Charles' words in Kwok a Sing's case and the statements which are to be found in such works as Carver's Carriage
of Goods by Sea (7th Edition p 142) or Russell on Crimes (7th Edition Vol 1 p 256) we consider that what Sir Charles
Hedges said in R v. Dawson need not be accepted as a precise definition to-day of piracy jure gentium' Nevertheless it must be recognised that until comparatively
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